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Abstract: In the era of Brexit and President Trump, it is clear that we need to talk about populism. 
Populist political campaigns feature ever more widely, suggesting the phenomenon of a ‘populist wave’. 
But do populist sentiments shape vote choice? Using data from Ireland and the United States, 
incorporating CSES Module 5 questions that focused on populist sentiments and vote choice in 2016, 
we show that populist sentiments did motivate voters in both countries. We also demonstrate, however, 
that the old reliables – economic perceptions, partisanship, and left-right ideology – mattered more. 
Thus, an exclusive focus on populism for the success of Donald Trump in the US or Sinn Féin/AAA in 
Ireland is unwarranted. Further, populist sentiments motivating vote choice differed between the two 
countries, raising fresh questions about whether populism can be regarded as an ideology and whether 
even the “chameleon” metaphor overclaims coherence for the term. 
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I  INTRODUCTION 
 
2016 was a seminal year in politics. It saw Britain’s decision to leave the EU 
(‘Brexit’) and the rise of anti-establishment parties and candidates in Australia, 
Iceland, Ireland, the Philippines, Slovakia and Spain. There was also perhaps the 
biggest electoral earthquake in modern times: Donald Trump’s victory in the 
American Presidential election, on what was widely accepted as a populist 
programme. Reflecting on such events, Adam Taylor (2016) of the Washington Post 
concluded: “If you had to sum up 2016 in one word, you might choose ‘populism’”. 
This followed successes for populist campaigns in Denmark, Sweden, Italy, 
and Bolivia, leading to talk of a populist wave (Galston, 2017; Inglehart and Norris, 
2016). This thesis posits that populist sentiments are spreading worldwide and are 
a primary determinant in election outcomes. A plethora of research on populism 
has developed, including a dimension examining its impact on vote choice (e.g. 
Pauwels, 2011; Ramiro and Gomez, 2017; Schumacher and Rooduijn, 2013; 
Rooduijn et al., 2016; Rooduijn, 2018).  
However, lacunae remain. A preponderance of populism voting studies focuses 
on the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and more recently Spain and Greece. 
While comparative studies are emerging, concentration remains on states that are 
relatively similar and that have a clear populist party in situ. Studies of countries 
that do not fit this profile are rarer. Additionally, reliance on data from non-election 
studies is frequent, often incorporating online samples, which rely on intention 
rather than reported behavior, raising questions about potential recall bias.  
Conceptually, the definition of populism is contested. While everyone agrees 
on a starting point of ‘the people’ versus an adversary, the purist perspective argues 
that a sole focus on ‘the elite’ as the nemesis is the only genuine form of populism, 
and is sufficient for it to qualify as an ideology (e.g. Akkerman et al., 2014; Mudde, 
2004). Others consider ‘the people’s’ struggle in the context of a range of ‘host’ 
ideologies (e.g. Taggart, 2000; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Ivarsflaten, 2008; 
de Koster et al., 2013; Zhirkov, 2014). Some have highlighted that the nemeses 
depend on the political actors framing them, leading to suggestions that separate 
strands of left-wing and right-wing populism, or subtypes exist (e.g. March 2007; 
Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013). Meanwhile, others contest populism’s 
characterisation as an ideology, with the idea of it even constituting a thin-centred 
ideology dismissed (e.g. Aslanidis, 2016; Bonikowski and Gidron, 2016). 
Meanwhile, opposition to the firmly entrenched purist view that anti-elitism is the 
only genuine form of populism and that populism constitutes an ideology is 
controversial and provokes claims that populism is not being adequately measured.  
Most existing work on vote choice and populism has focused on three tenets, 
namely immigration, anti-EU sentiment, and anti-elitism. Few studies have sought 
to explore the impact of nativist attitudes on the vote empirically – feelings 
regarding what characteristics are essential for a person to belong to a particular 
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nationality, and which we argue are linked to populism in the sense that they imply 
an anti-pluralist predisposition. The impact of a strong leader, another attribute 
associated with the success of populist parties (Mudde, 2004), also remains less 
explored in the voting literature. Our paper fills this void. Our contribution assumes 
a symbiotic relationship between ‘populism’ and several ‘host ideologies’, thus 
deviating from the purist view of simply focusing on anti-elitism. While our 
conceptualisation of populism incorporates the ‘purist’ view (Mudde, 2004), we 
also explore a broader range of nemeses identified in the literature that pits the 
virtuous people against a range of out-groups (immigrants, non-natives, which both 
imply an anti-pluralist viewpoint). We do not claim that this is a complete list of 
antagonists. However, we contend that it captures many of the motivations 
associated with actors campaigning on a populist platform, as highlighted in the 
literature. We also explore the impact of people attracted to a strong leader who 
will shake up the system (e.g. Bos et al., 2013; Ivarsflaten, 2008), which taps into 
the idea of politicians who “know the people…who make their wishes come true” 
(Mudde 2004, p.558) even if it means challenging the conventional wisdom, thus 
mapping onto the volonté générale dimension of populism.  
We explore the impact of populism on vote choice in the American presidential 
and Irish general elections of 2016. Three things motivate our focus on Ireland and 
the US. First, we take a diverse case study approach (Seawright and Gerring, 2008; 
Gerring and Cojocaru, 2016) and explore two cases that have received much less 
attention than other countries in the populism literature, a departure from the 
conventional case study approach which explores more likely cases. By 
incorporating more macro diversity, fresh insights might be offered. Second, we 
focus on comparative election study data and are among the first to use the 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Module 5 battery of questions 
tapping populism, which allows us to estimate a comprehensive vote choice model. 
This circumvents many of the drawbacks of using non-election data identified 
earlier. Crucially, the same questions are asked of respondents in both countries. 
An additional boon is that it also allows us to put the election of Donald Trump 
into a comparative context. Third, both elections were held in 2016, at what we 
might consider the height of the populist wave. Moreover, as Ireland and the US 
pre-2016 would not have been conventionally thought of as typical places for 
populist voting to take hold, they offer solid ground to test the plausibility of the 
Populist Wave thesis. If populism is impacting vote choice in both these states, 
support for the populist wave proposition will be strengthened. If not or it is 
outshone by other factors, the importance of populism to voters globally might need 
to be re-evaluated.  
Our results show that populist sentiments did motivate some voters in both 
countries, but that different tenets stimulated a populist vote in each state. This 
implies some support for the idea of a populist wave as populist tenets shaped vote 
choice. However, in both countries, the old reliables – economic perceptions, 
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partisanship, and ideological positions – had a much more significant impact on 
voters than did populism, implying that while populism mattered in 2016, it perhaps 
did not influence voters as much as conventional wisdom suggests. More 
fundamentally, the results resurrect questions about populism’s status as an 
ideology.  
 
 
II  THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
2.1 Deﬁning Populism 
Populism is a challenging concept to classify. In the literature explicitly devoted to 
populism, Mudde first articulated the current hegemonic definition. He maintains 
that populism is “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into 
two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt 
elite’”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale 
of the people (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). Building on Freeden (1998), Mudde (2004, 
pp. 543-4) classifies populism as a ‘thin-centred ideology’ as opposed to a thick-
centred ideology such as liberalism or socialism, that can be combined with other 
host ideologies (be they thick or thin). At the core of populism is “the people: …  
a mythical and constructed sub-set of the whole population” (ibid, p. 544) that is 
virtuous, homogeneous, and pure. Elites, on the other hand, are harmful enemies 
of the people (a Manichean worldview). Pluralism also features as an opposite of 
populism’s homogeneity – arguably opening the way for a more extensive range 
of host ideologies. Nevertheless, this base definition confines the core of populism 
to the pure people, the corrupt elite, and the concept of volonté générale (also see 
Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013).  
Mudde (2004) intends his definition to provide a solid foundation for empirical 
research. Yet, while it is widely cited, many authors stretch it – sometimes 
significantly. Views especially differ on whether populism constitutes an ideology 
– even a ‘thin’ one – with some arguing that it is better defined as a discursive  
frame (e.g. Aslanidis, 2016). Such framing can involve strategic politicisation of 
citizens’ discontents by political actors (Hawkins et al., 2019), but may include 
instances where normative assumptions of opportunism may not be especially valid 
(Aslanidis, 2016). 
Others argue that the range of “the people’s” antagonists goes beyond 
politicians and can include legal elites, powerful business interests, the media, 
immigrants, or cultural or religious groups frowned on by nativists within a given 
society (Canovan, 1999). Variation in the profile of populism derived from this 
range of potential mutual antipathies has been likened to the chameleon (Taggart 
2000),1 with some suggesting that populism can contain various subtypes 
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1 This small carnivorous reptile changes its colour dramatically to maintain camouflage as it moves through 
its immediate environment, while remaining the same animal under its skin.
depending on the left-right ideological disposition of the actor framing the populist 
message (e.g. March, 2007; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013). While scholars differ 
as to how fundamental the difference between subtypes is, the critical point is that 
such research highlights the conditioning effect of context regarding how populism 
can evolve.  
The role of context brings to the forefront the relationship between populism 
and host ideologies. Some scholars have explored triggers of populism such as 
nationalism, immigration, and leadership style and rhetoric (Bos et al., 2013; 
Ivarsflaten, 2008; de Koster et al., 2013; Zhirkov, 2014), building on issues 
highlighted by Mudde himself (2004, p.547-8). More recently, however, a purist 
view has emerged in the populist literature that attempts to re-focus solely on the 
three core aspects of populism (e.g. Akkermann et al., 2014). This narrower 
paradigm focuses exclusively on ‘the people’ (and its volonté générale) and its 
antagonism towards political elites and the idea that politics is a moral struggle 
between good and evil. This view insists that host ideologies remain distinct from 
populism itself and that any attempt to constitute ‘the people’ in ways other than in 
opposition to a corrupt political elite is misguided, despite acknowledging that 
populist subtypes exist (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013).  
With respect to voting, the purist view is that populist attitudes, narrowly 
conceived in the frame of ‘the people’ versus the elite, shapes voting behavior (e.g. 
Akkerman et al., 2014). Moreover, despite accepting that populism can be taken 
up by actors on the left and right of the political divide, they insist that this purist 
definition can stand as an ideology. However, the lack of cohesion of the concept 
is one ground for challenging the claim that populism is an ideology, with several 
scholars disputing this classification (e.g. Aslanidis, 2016; Bonikowski and Gidron, 
2016). Most empirical scholarship has tended to gloss over this controversial issue. 
However, as more empirical data become available, we can explore whether similar 
tenets matter in different contexts. If populism is indeed an ideology, we should 
see that it achieves coherence cross-nationally (Gerring, 1997). For coherence, one 
expectation would be the same populist tenets influence voting no matter the 
context. If this is not met, it would emphasise that host ideologies are fundamentally 
important to the study of populism, that antagonists of “the people” are not merely 
politicians but could be from the wider community, and that populism on its own 
would fail to meet the requirements to be considered an ideology.  
In the vein of Mudde’s definition, we accept that anti-elitism is a core of 
populism and hence we incorporate a measure of it into our analysis. However, our 
definition of populism goes beyond this ‘purist’ view. We strongly advocate that 
context is likely to determine how actors will characterise the nemeses and thus the 
link with the host ideology is crucial because it is essential for defining ‘the people’ 
and its enemies. Consequently, and in line with other scholarship (e.g. Southwell 
et al., 2016; Inglehart and Norris, 2016), our definition also includes a wider range 
of antagonists. Therefore, we explore antipathy of ‘the people’ towards out-groups 
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like immigrants and non-natives, as well as examining the importance of leadership 
style, and their impact on vote choice. 
 
2.2 Populism and the Vote  
Beyond the populist literature, existing scholarship on electoral behavior has 
highlighted protest voting – a vote cast to scare the elite and which is not policy 
driven (van der Brug et al., 2000); and the increasing importance of parties that 
challenge the mainstream consensus, reject centrism, and champion niche or ‘new’ 
issues. The latter strand of study has led to the development of several taxonomies 
to explain the rejection of traditional political actors, including challenger parties 
(e.g. Hino 2012; Hobolt and Tilley 2016), niche parties (e.g. Adams et al., 2006; 
Wagner 2012), and some describing such actors as populists (e.g. Mudde 2007). 
There is obvious cross-over between populism and these other classifications. 
Protest voting and support for those embracing a populist agenda are linked, as both 
involve a rejection of the political establishment. Research has demonstrated that 
voting for populists is in part due to such political discontent (e.g. Bélanger and 
Aarts, 2006; Rooduijn et al., 2016). Meanwhile, actors standing on a populist 
platform reject consensus and the existing political order, adopt more extreme 
positions, and stress new issues; hallmarks of challenger and niche parties (Wagner 
2012; Hobolt and Tilley, 2016). Hence, no matter the terminology, all these concepts 
emphasise the rejection of politics as it is now, and thus it might be that populism 
with respect to electoral behavior constitutes nothing new. What makes populism 
stand out is its denunciation of the elite, especially politicians, but also its discontent 
with pluralism, and the volonté générale aspect of its outlook (Mudde, 2004), hence 
our focus on it.  
Studies of populism taking voters as the unit of analysis can be broadly divided 
into three strands, although some explore multiple aspects simultaneously. The first 
strand focuses on how best populist sentiments among citizens can be measured 
(e.g. Akkerman et al., 2014; Schulz et al., 2017). The second strand concentrates 
on which voters are more likely to hold populist views, with personality traits, 
gender differences, and attitudes to protest all influential regarding who has populist 
sentiments and who does not (Bakker et al., 2016; Rooduijn et al., 2016; 
Schumacher and Rooduijn, 2013; Spierings and Zaslove, 2017). The third strand, 
and the one we focus on, investigates voters’ populist attitudes and their impact on 
the vote. Akkermann et al. (2014) take a purist conception of populism and 
demonstrate that holding a variety of ‘populist’ attitudes correlates with an intention 
to vote for both right and left-populist parties in the Netherlands. Others have 
highlighted the importance to vote choice of the propinquity of the policy position 
of a party standing on a populist platform to the voter’s policy position (Ivarsflaten, 
2008; Schumacher and Rooduijn, 2013). Indeed, there is a clear connection between 
policy issues, such as immigration for Vlaams Belang in Belgium (Pauwels, 2011), 
or Euroscepticism for UKIP in Britain (Ford et al., 2011) and Podemos in Spain 
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(Ramiro and Gomez, 2017), and support for so-called populist actors. Yet Rooduijn 
(2018) challenges the premise that there is any unifying basis constituting support 
for actors embracing populism cross-nationally. Another aspect of the literature has 
noted the class dimension of support for radical right parties in particular, many of 
which embrace populism, noting that these actors obtain more support from the 
working class compared with the middle class (e.g. Ford and Goodwin 2014; Oesch 
and Rennwald, 2018), with support emanating from a desire to protect national 
identity from outsiders (e.g. Oesch, 2008), or from the lack of labor market 
opportunities for certain groups (e.g. Kriesi et al., 2012; Beramendi et al., 2018).  
However gaps remain. Most of the above studies rely on countries that have 
‘classic’ populist parties in situ. Our research focuses on a more diverse set of cases 
without typical populist actors in place prior to 2016. Moreover, a comparison of 
these two cases with one another helps us to detect the presence of the so-called 
populist wave supposedly sweeping electoral politics globally. Meanwhile, 
comparative studies, while evolving, remain few. Also, existing studies have tended 
to overlook attitudes to nativism and a strong leader who will bend the rules. Our 
study tests these two critical dimensions along with the more conventional populist 
measures: anti-elitism; and one of the main policy issues populist actors have 
campaigned on, namely anti-immigration sentiments.  
 
2.2.1 Desire for a strong leader who will bend the rules  
There is a burgeoning literature showing that leaders influence vote choice, be it 
through their likeability (e.g. Costa-Lobo and Curtice, 2015), their personal 
attributes (e.g. Bean and Mughan, 1989), their performance in television debates 
(Pattie and Johnston, 2011), or their policy positions. In the first instance, for 
populist voting to take hold, there needs to be an option for voters to turn to – a 
political entrepreneur. This often manifests itself in the form of an attractive leader, 
an issue which Mudde highlights in his seminal article (Mudde, 2004, pp. 545-7, 
556-8). He says: “citizens first and foremost want leadership. They want politicians 
‘who ‘know’ (rather than listen to) the people and who make their wishes come 
true” (Mudde 2004, p.558). The ‘strong leader who will bend the rules’ dimension 
reaches beyond the idea of a merely charismatic leader to one who will implement 
the volonté générale of the people even if it means riding rough-shod over 
established practices.  
The charismatic populist leader portrays himself as a crisis manager reluctantly 
getting involved in politics to tackle the mess created by established politicians, 
while nevertheless remaining an ordinary, straight-talking man of the people 
(Taggart, 2000). Such leaders are easy to think of: Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, 
Marine Le Pen in France, Alexis Tsipras in Greece, and Hugo Chavez of Venezuela 
– the list goes on. They dramatise the harm that is being done to ‘the people’, 
heightening tension between citizens and established politicians (Albertazzi, 2007). 
Through their rhetoric of challenging the status quo, they attract media attention to 
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their cause (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007) and appeal to lower educated, less 
politically efficacious voters (Bos et al., 2013). This ‘outsider’ leader will sweep 
all the dross away from ‘politics as normal’, where elites fail to uphold the will of 
the people, greatly improving the existence of the ordinary citizen (‘Us’) at the 
expense of those currently favored (‘Them’) (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). We 
recognise that a charismatic leader alone is not a sufficient condition to lead to 
populist voting (Muis and Immerzeel, 2016). Instead, we believe that actors 
presenting themselves as a strong leader ‘who will bend the rules’ go beyond mere 
charisma or voting for the leader. It is a particular trait the leader is promising to 
embrace and we posit that people who find such a style appealing might be more 
inclined to vote populist. Thus, we assume that:  
 
H1: The more voters express a desire for a strong leader who will bend the 
rules, the greater the probability that they will vote for a party or candidate 
who campaigns from a populist platform 
 
2.2.2 Anti-Political Elite Attitudes 
Purist conceptions of populism privilege anti-elitism. In the words of Mudde (2004, 
p.543), ‘the corrupt elite’ is the sole antagonist of ‘the virtuous people’. Elitism is 
‘the mirror image’ of populism (Akkerman et al., 2014; Bakker et al., 2016). Parties 
seeking to tackle corruption in government should not necessarily be labeled 
populist (Hanley and Sikk, 2016), nor is an anti-elitist stance necessary for a 
populist party to flourish (Ivarsflaten, 2008). However, anti-elitism is conven -
tionally accepted as a critical pillar of populist motivations and thus any discussion 
of populism should incorporate it.  
This tenet complements the ‘desire for a strong leader who will bend the rules’ 
by focusing on the makers of those rules. Here we have an antagonistic, 
homogeneous group – ‘the political elite’ – which threatens ‘the people’ and which 
is evil. Established politicians are blamed for all the problems besetting a country. 
Failure to resolve these stems not just from incompetence, but from dereliction of 
their duty to care about the lives of the voters who elected them, and a selfish 
interest to please the rich and powerful who will reward them well. The relationship 
between voters and established politicians is dramatised as a battle between good 
and evil (Akkerman et al., 2014). A voter who seeks ‘real change’ may support a 
new kind of politician who comes from outside the establishment and promises to 
shake up the system and look after the deserving ordinary man in the street. Thus, 
in the tradition of the purist conception of populism, if populist voting is emerging, 
we assume that:  
 
H2: The more voters express anti-elitist sentiments, the higher the probability 
that they will vote for a party or candidate who campaigns from a populist 
platform 
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2.2.3 Anti-immigrant sentiment 
An anti-immigration stance does not necessarily indicate populism as there can be 
genuine economic concerns motivating dislike of migration. However, once anti-
immigrant sentiment is couched in terms of the ‘worthy’ people versus the ‘wicked’ 
migrant, it comes within the purview of populism. Such negativity towards 
immigration is the single policy position that united populist parties of the right 
that achieved electoral success in Europe (Ivarsflaten, 2008), and it continues to be 
a familiar refrain of populist campaigns (Bohman, 2015). Parties of the left can also 
take a negative stance towards immigration where anti-immigration views attain 
salience in election campaigns (van Spanje, 2010). The theoretical basis for 
connecting this kind of anti-immigration stance to populism emerges from the fact 
that pluralism is a direct opposite of populism and ‘rejects the homogeneity of both 
populism and elitism’ (Mudde, 2004, p.544). A key dimension of pluralism is that 
‘pluralists are accommodating to diversity and a plurality of voices’ (Akkermann 
et al., 2014, p. 1331). Pluralism accepts that society is made up of different groups 
and consequently, the political will should be reflective of society’s multiple 
preferences (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013, p. 152), instead of the volonté générale 
of the homogeneous people. Indeed, as Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013, p. 152) 
acknowledge, “the term ‘pluralism’ has increasingly been used to refer to ethnic, 
cultural, or religious groups, usually in a fashion that advocates wide latitude for 
such minorities.” Hence, it follows that Manichean negativity regarding immigrants 
involves a rejection of pluralism, and thus its link to populism. 
Negativity towards immigrants manifests itself in concerns regarding increasing 
crime, threats to national security and jobs, as well as undermining national culture, 
and putting a strain on the welfare system (Zaslove, 2004). Immigration creates 
winners and losers among different socioeconomic groups in society (Gabel, 1998), 
thus stoking anti-immigrant sentiment, especially among less educated citizens, 
who are more receptive to rhetorical attacks on migrants (Bos et al., 2013). Hence, 
we posit that:  
 
H3: The more voters express anti-immigrant sentiments the greater the 
probability that they will vote for a party or candidate who campaigns from 
a populist platform 
  
2.2.4 Nativist Attitudes 
Nativism is often conflated with anti-immigration sentiment and the two attitudes 
can undoubtedly intersect. Nativism involves interconnected ideas about society, 
the past, and the future, and who can lay claim to a nationality (Knobel, 1996). 
Traditions are considered to flow from a shared folk history that should be accepted 
by all who come to live in this society. Assimilation is not enough; there is implied 
supremacy of people who can trace their forebears back in time, and should be 
favored over people who lack these characteristics.  
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There has been some difference in the way nativism has developed in America 
and Europe,2 although by now the two strands are very similar. Arguments that 
other cultures were ‘equal but different’; and that each belonged in its place which 
deserved protection from dilution, paved the way for electoral breakthroughs by 
parties campaigning on a populist platform in Europe from the 1970s onwards (e.g. 
Rydgren, 2005). The link between nativism and populism is controversial. Mudde 
(2004, p. 549) acknowledges that “the step from ‘the nation’ to ‘the people’ is easily 
taken, and the distinction between the two is often far from clear”, going on to show 
that populist rightist parties drum up support on this issue (also see Mudde, 2007). 
Yet, he goes on to argue that as nativism is linked to conceptions of the nation-state 
(ibid, p. 19), its definition of ‘the people’ is entirely different from the definition of 
‘the people’ in a populist sense, and thus “populism functions at best as a fuzzy 
blanket to camouflage the nastier nativism” (Mudde, 2017). However, given that 
pluralism, the antithesis of populism, involves the need to accommodate diversity 
and does not prioritise one group over another, it is hard not to conclude that 
nativists are anti-pluralists, and thus a link with populism, at least as a host ideology, 
is plausible. We maintain that nativism can act as a host ideology as it can involve 
antagonism toward other groups of people which are distinct from ‘the native 
people’ and can lead to the development of an ‘us versus them’ conception that is 
Manichean.  
Immigrants undoubtedly do become targets for nativist ire under some 
conditions. An economic downturn can trigger a sense that ‘natives’ deserve more 
protection than other groups in society. However, nativism can manifest itself in 
other forms. Some ‘out’ groups may be more unwelcome than others; some may 
be of quite long standing within society. Others may even emerge from the ranks 
of ‘the people’ to espouse cosmopolitan, multicultural ideas that nativists regard as 
damaging to national identity (Galindo and Vigil, 2006; Hellstrøm and Hervik, 
2014). This leads to our fourth hypothesis: 
 
H4: The more voters express nativist sentiments the greater the probability 
that they will vote for a party or candidate who campaigns from a populist 
platform   
 
III  CASE SELECTION 
 
We chose the United States and Ireland to study for several reasons. First,the 
existing literature on populism and vote choice on the demand side concentrates 
on a small number of states, notably the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland, 
where actors embracing a populist platform have been successful over time  
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2 The American meaning of nativism did not encompass the sense of an inherent biological trait that was 
evident in fascism in Europe. In post WWII Europe, proponents of xenophobia remained on the margins 
politically for years.
(e.g. Akkerman et al., 2014; Helms, 1997; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Pauwels, 
2011; Schumacher and Rooduijn, 2013; Spruyt et al., 2016; Rooduijn et al., 2016). 
While studies of other states such as Greece and Spain are becoming more 
prominent (e.g. Ramiro and Gomez, 2017; Stavrakakis et al., 2016), for the most 
part the existing literature remains firmly focused on studies of polities which are 
distinctly alike, namely continental European multi-party parliamentary systems 
using proportional electoral systems. While comparative studies embracing more 
country diversity do exist (e.g. Ivarsflaten, 2008; Rooduijn, 2018; Oesch and 
Rennwald, 2018), for the most part, the populist vote literature remains open to the 
critique that it is heavily reliant on studies of most likely cases. What is required is 
to go beyond studying most likely cases. Hence, our contribution takes a diverse 
case study approach (Seawright and Gerring, 2008; Gerring and Cojocaru, 2016) 
by focusing on two cases: Ireland and the United States. They are different from 
the cases conventionally explored in the literature as, prior to 2016, neither had an 
actor actively articulating a populist rhetoric. Moreover, the United States is a 
Presidential system, a departure from most of the existing research. And while 
Ireland boasts the hallmarks of multi-party European democracy, its use of the STV 
electoral system and the fact it has lacked for the most part a radical right party 
(O’Malley, 2008) means it stands aside from the conventional cases explored in the 
populist literature. In sum, our focus on these two diverse cases vis-à-vis the usual 
suspect cases is deliberate and enhances the macro variation on tests of populism’s 
impact on the vote. 
Second, while a focus on one or two states would be insufficient to thoroughly 
test the worldwide populist wave thesis, our study in this respect acts as a 
plausibility probe (Levy, 2008). This involves testing the assumption that populism 
is conditioning vote choice in a small number of cases, cases which deviate from 
the conventional cases explored, before more extensive analyses are undertaken. 
In the vein of Sinatra’s “if I can make it there I can make it anywhere” (Levy, 2008, 
p. 12), Ireland and the United States are quite distinct in their political and economic 
cultures, ranging from different political rules through different levels of 
partisanship in each state (see Appendix Table D.10 for more). Our strategy of 
selecting cases that are distinct from one another is meticulous, as our goal is to 
establish whether common mechanisms – namely whether the same populist 
sentiments correlate with vote in very different contextual circumstances – exist. 
In sum, if we see populist sentiments conditioning the vote in Ireland and the US, 
two diverse cases from one another, arguments for the existence of a populist wave 
will be more justified.  
Third, populist voting in both countries has received less attention than the most 
likely cases (for exceptions see Bakker et al., 2016; Guardino and Snyder, 2012; 
O’Malley and Fitzgibbon, 2015; Marsh et al. 2018). And yet despite the apparent 
differences between the two states, the political context in 2016 was similar on a 
number of fronts. We saw the rejection of the political establishment: in Ireland the 
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vote of the three traditional parties – Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and Labour – dropped 
to its lowest share ever (Farrell and Suiter, 2016); while in the United States, a 
political novice defeated 15 other established candidates in the Republican primary. 
Moreover, trust in various political institutions was exceptionally low in both states 
(Eurobarometer Standard Report, 2016; Pew Research Centre, 2017). Attacks on 
the so-called political elite were commonplace. In Ireland, still reeling from an 
EU/IMF bailout during the Global Financial Crisis, anti-establishment parties Sinn 
Féin (a party with strong paramilitary associations), and the Anti-Austerity Alliance, 
as well as independents, reaped the electoral benefits. Meanwhile, in the US, Donald 
Trump’s tirades against political elites – with calls to “drain the swamp” and slurs 
of “Crooked Hillary” – were ceaseless. In sum, the electoral context in both polities 
lent itself to populist voting emerging and with these dissimilar countries both 
holding elections in 2016, when the populist wave was said to be at a new peak, 
we assert these countries offer an ideal testing ground for our assumptions, 
especially as the same questions were asked of respondents in both countries in an 
election study setting. 
Some critics might argue that in choosing Ireland and the United States, which 
have heterogeneous parties and candidates, we are merely tapping into ideological 
subtypes of populism, and thus different individual motivations for a populist vote 
are inevitable. However, this is to miss the point of our investigation. The populist 
wave thesis assumes that the same motivations are driving voter choice globally 
regardless of context. In addition, the theoretical discussion on populism generally 
assumes that it is an ideology, albeit a thin one, with the acknowledgment of 
subtypes a relatively recent phenomenon (e.g. Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Mudde 
and Kaltwasser, 2013). Moreover, this contention assumes that specific motivations 
map precisely on to left or right. We do not share this assumption. For example, 
anti-elitism can be expected to inform both left and right wing populist platforms. 
Attitudes to EU integration have also drawn the ire of both populists on the left and 
right. Further, an anti-immigration stance, traditionally associated with candidates 
of the right has also been taken up by some on the left (van Spanje, 2010). 
Additionally, purist conceptions of populism assume that anti-elitism is the essential 
ingredient of populism with other “nemeses of the people” taking a back seat. If 
these pillars hold up, namely that populism is something which we can talk of as a 
unified phenomenon with anti-elitism the common denominator of motivations, we 
should observe these stimuli influence the vote no matter the context.  
 
 
IV  DATA AND METHODS 
4.1 Data  
Our data comes from two sources. The US data are from the American National 
Election Study (ANES) 2016 Time Series File (2017). For Ireland, we use the 2016 
Irish National Election Study (INES) (Marsh et al., 2016). These data are unified 
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by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Module 5, meaning 
identical questions on populism were posed to respondents.  
The 2016 ANES had two independently drawn probability components of 
eligible American voters: a face-to-face sample and an online sample.3 It yielded 
an initial N of 3,647 respondents, which reduced to 2,452 because of abstention 
and item non-response. The 2016 Irish National Election Study was a random 
probability post-election study conducted by telephone. It yielded an initial N of 
1,000 respondents, which reduced to 785 because of abstention and item non-
response. 
 
4.2 Variable Operationalisation and Modeling Strategy 
Our dependent variable is vote choice. For the United States, we focus on the 
Presidential election and categorise Republican Party nominee Donald Trump as a 
candidate that stood on a populist platform.4 For Ireland, we build on a consensus 
that Sinn Féin has embraced many of the hallmarks of the populist platform (see 
O’Malley, 2008; O’Malley and Fitzgibbon, 2015).5 Additionally, we classify the 
Anti-Austerity Alliance/People Before Profit (AAA) as a party that espoused 
populist views calling for a ‘political revolution’ in its manifesto.6 Its rhetoric 
highlighted anti-elitism, “sweetheart deals for big business”, and its candidates were 
prominent in many of the campaigns against austerity.7 For comparability, our 
dependent variable is dichotomous and captures a vote for a party/candidate 
standing on a populist platform versus all others, and thus we opt for logit models.8  
The measurement of populism has received greater attention in recent years 
(e.g. Akkerman et al., 2014; Schulz et al., 2017). All incorporate what we refer to 
as a purist dimension (Akkermann et al., 2014, p. 1331). The CSES has three such 
measures. Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement/disagreement on a 
five-point Likert scale to the following statements: (a) “politicians are the main 
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3 For robustness, we estimated our American models excluding the online component and found similar 
results to those reported (see Appendix Table D.7).  
4 For robustness, we re-estimated our models with vote for the Republican Party as the dependent variable 
and we found similar results to those reported with the exception that nativism only correlated with a vote 
for Trump (see Table Appendix D.5).  
5 Further, Sinn Féin’s 2016 manifesto (p.10 and p.30) highlights much of what we would expect from a 
party campaigning on a populist platform including “taking on the golden circles and vested interests” and 
critiques that “cronyism is alive and well in Fine Gael and the Labour Party”.  
6 Some might challenge combining Sinn Féin and the AAA together. However, the number of voters that 
report supporting the AAA is low and robustness checks show our results do not change with the inclusion 
of the AAA.  
7 Some scholars have noted that some non-party candidates in Ireland embrace a populist platform. While 
we believe there is merit to this, classifying all non-party candidates on this basis would be incorrect as 
many build their success on localism. It is impossible to disentangle independents from one another in the 
data at our disposal.  
8 For robustness, we estimate our models on other parties/candidates too – see Table D.2 and D.3 for Ireland 
and Table D.6 for America. 
problem in the country”; (b) “politicians don’t care about the people”; and  
(c) “politicians only care about the rich and powerful”. The first two CSES 
measures are designed to tap negative attitudes to the elite in Manichean terms.  
The third focuses specifically on whether they privilege the rich and powerful  
(see Hobolt et al., 2016). These measures are similar to those of Akkermann et al., 
2014 and Schulz et al., 2017, which place some emphasis on politicians and 
critiques of politicians as working against ‘the people’. Thus, we maintain that the 
CSES anti-elitist measures are functionally equivalent to the other studies. From 
our three anti-elitist questions, we constructed an index (see Appendix B for more 
details).  
Our study also taps other nemeses of ‘the people’ by looking at related tenets 
measured by the CSES. To tap the impact of charismatic leaders who will shake up 
the system, a respondent’s agreement/disagreement on a 5-point scale was sought 
to the following statement: “Having a strong leader in government is good for 
[COUNTRY] even if the leader bends the rules to get things done”. To examine 
respondents’ opposition to pluralism, which is in direct contrast to populism, we 
assess their attitudes to out-groups. The first such group is immigrants. Respondents 
were asked agreement/disagreement on a five-point Likert scale with the statements: 
“Immigrants are generally good for COUNTRY’s economy”, and “COUNTRY’s 
culture is generally harmed by immigrants”. Our other measures of attitudes 
towards out-groups asked respondents the extent of importance they attach to three 
things associated with nativism, namely: the importance of “being able to speak 
the country’s national language”, the importance of “having the nation’s ancestry”, 
and the importance of being “born in the country”. 9  
We take a conservative modeling strategy and control for partisanship, left-
right ideology, and economic perceptions.10 We also include measures of age, 
education, sex, and region of residence. The operationalisation of the variables is 
detailed in Appendix A, and we provide summary statistics and scaling analysis in 
Appendix B. 
 
 
V  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
We begin by exploring the extent of populist attitudes in both states. Figure 1 details 
voters’ desire for a strong leader who bends the rules to get things done, their 
attitudes towards politicians, their views on immigration, and the extent of their 
nativist sentiments. We see there are mixed views in both states about a strong 
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9 The principal component analysis in America identified only two factors. While the immigration and 
nativist measures scaled together, for theoretical reasons and to ensure maximum comparability, we created 
two separate indexes (see Appendix Table B.4). 
10 Some might argue that the inclusion of partisanship is too conservative. For robustness, we re-estimate 
our models by omitting partisanship and do not find any significant deviations from the analysis reported 
in text (see Appendix Tables D.1 and D.4). 
leader who bends the rules to get things done. There is stronger support for the 
proposition in Ireland, with 48 per cent of voters agreeing, whereas only 37 per 
cent of US voters did so. Conversely, there is opposition, with 44 per cent of US 
voters disagreeing, and 46 per cent of Irish voters saying likewise.  
 
Figure 1: Populist Sentiments Among Voters in Ireland and the United 
States 2016 (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (ANES, 2017; Marsh et al., 2016). Base: Voters only.  
Note: United States weighted analyses based on post-election respondents. Stacked bars 
may not equal 100 per cent because of rounding. 
 
Anti-politician sentiment was stronger in America. Forty-five per cent of voters 
expressed some level of anti-politician feeling whereas only 33 per cent of Irish 
voters did so. Meanwhile, 43 per cent of Irish voters expressed a favorable view 
towards politicians while in the US this was 16 per cent. Figure 1 shows that in 
both Ireland and the United States, anti-immigrant sentiments are confined to a 
small segment of voters. Only 11 per cent of Americans and 9 per cent of Irish 
voters expressed strong anti-immigrant views. The prevailing view on this subject 
was that immigrants made a positive contribution: 63 per cent of Irish voters and 
48 per cent of American voters thought this. Regarding nativism, 62 per cent of US 
voters said it was fairly or very important while support for the proposition in 
Ireland, although less, was still substantial at 45 per cent. In sum, populist 
sentiments were permeating the Irish and American electorates with anti-politician 
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feelings in both states extensive, nativism important, and significant proportions of 
voters in both states willing to support the emergence of a strong leader who bends 
the rules to get things done. The critical question is whether these sentiments 
influence vote choice in a meaningful way. We present the bivariate relationships 
in Figure 2. The evidence from America is more promising regarding the idea that 
these sentiments correlate with support for parties/candidates standing on a populist 
platform. Those who agree with the premise of having a strong leader who bends 
the rules to get things done vote in higher numbers for Mr Trump. In Ireland 
however, there is no discernible relationship between this view and support for 
SF/AAA. Mr Trump also harvested more support from voters who were anti-
immigrant. Seventy-eight and 80 per cent of voters respectively who held somewhat 
or strong anti-immigrant views supported him, compared with only 8 per cent who 
held strongly pro-immigrant sentiments. In Ireland however, the relationship was 
absent, although SF/AAA did draw more support from voters who said they 
fervently opposed immigrants. Mr Trump also drew more support from voters who 
thought nativism was important (60 per cent supported Mr Trump, whereas he 
gained only 6 per cent support among those who said it was “not at all important”). 
However, such a pattern is not visible in Ireland.  
 
Figure 2: Populist Sentiments and Vote Choice in the 2016 Irish General 
Election and the 2016 US Presidential Election 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (ANES, 2017; Marsh et al., 2016). Base: Voters only.  
Note: United States weighted analyses based on post-election respondents. 
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More promising is the pattern in Ireland about anti-elite views. Voters who 
expressed greater anti-politician feeling voted more for Sinn Féin/AAA. Seven per 
cent of Irish voters who said they had no anti-politician feeling reported voting for 
SF/AAA compared with 35 per cent who had strong anti-politician sentiment. In 
America, Donald Trump also drew more support from voters who felt dis satis -
faction with politicians, although the effect was much less (a 7-point difference).  
But to stand on firmer ground, a multivariate strategy is required (see Tables 1 
for Ireland and 2 for the US). Model I contains the fundamentals of vote choice 
and sociodemographics. Not surprisingly, for both states, it shows that partisanship 
is a crucial determinant of support for both Mr Trump and Sinn Féin/AAA. 
Moreover, ideology was a strong determinant too: the more right a voter was in the 
United States, the higher the probability that they voted for Mr Trump. The more 
left a voter in Ireland, the greater the chance they opted for SF/AAA. Economic 
perceptions were omnipresent too. When voters perceived the economy to have 
performed poorly in both America and Ireland, they were more likely to have opted 
for Mr Trump and SF/AAA.  
To these base models, we add the four so-called populist sentiments.  
 
Table 1: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for Sinn 
Féin/Anti-Austerity Alliance in the 2016 Irish General Election  
Dependent variable: Vote for Sinn Féin and Anti-Austerity Alliance  
                                                         I-IE           II-IE          III-IE         IV-IE          V-IE  
Attached to Sinn Féin                 5.088***   5.091***   4.937***     5.110***   5.178*** 
                                                  (0.520)       (0.521)      (0.516)        (0.523)       (0.531) 
Ideology                                    –0.252*** –0.245**   –0.232**    –0.246**   –0.242** 
                                                  (0.071)       (0.072)      (0.070)        (0.072)       (0.071) 
Retrospective economy            –0.490*** –0.484**   –0.263        –0.505**   –0.506** 
                                                  (0.170)       (0.170)      (0.181)        (0.171)       (0.171) 
Strong leader who bends rules    –              –0.049         –                  –                – 
                                                                    (0.101)                                                
Anti-politician sentiment            –                                  0.459**       –                – 
                                                                                      (0.144)                               
Anti-immigration sentiment       –                                  –                –0.103         – 
                                                                                                          (0.159)           
Nativist sentiment                       –                                  –                  –              –0.269 
                                                                                                                            (0.192)  
N                                             785            785            785              785            785 
Log likelihood                      –169.40     –169.28     –164.17       –169.19     –168.40 
Pseudo-R2                                           0.479         0.480         0.495           0.480         0.482  
Source: (Marsh et al., 2016). Base: Voters only.  
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Demographic variables not displayed. Full model 
available in Table C.1 in Appendix.
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Model II tests whether voters who desired a strong leader that bends the rules 
to get things done resulted in a higher likelihood of supporting parties/candidates 
standing on a populist platform. In Ireland, we find no indication that such feelings 
increased the chances of supporting SF/AAA. In America, the coefficient is positive 
and statistically significant (p=0.042). However, when we tease this out by 
estimating the predicted probabilities, the effect is very modest (a 6 point increase 
in the likelihood of supporting Mr Trump from strongly disagree to strongly agree). 
Considering the significant cross-over in confidence intervals, at best we can deduce 
weak support for H1. Coupled with the lack of evidence for such an effect in 
Ireland, we infer that this tenet had little sway.  
 
Table 2: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the vote for Donald 
Trump in the 2016 American Presidential Election  
Dependent variable: Vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 US Presidential election  
                                                        I-US          II-US         III-US        IV-US         V-US  
Attached to GOP                        3.058***   3.051***  3.060***    3.109***   3.106***  
                                                  (0.181)       (0.182)      (0.181)        (0.194)       (0.190) 
Ideology                                      0.258***   0.250***   0.258***    0.212***   0.220*** 
                                                  (0.035)       (0.036)      (0.035)        (0.038)       (0.037) 
Retrospective economy            –0.835*** –0.841*** –0.834***  –0.743*** –0.802***  
                                                  (0.066)       (0.066)      (0.066)        (0.070)       (0.065) 
Strong leader who bends rules    –                0.126*       –                  –                – 
                                                                    (0.057)                                                
Anti-politician sentiment            –                –                0.010           –                – 
                                                                                      (0.085)                               
Anti-immigration sentiment       –                –                –                  0.757***   – 
                                                                                                          (0.087)           
Nativist sentiment                       –                –                –                  –                0.489***  
                                                                                                                            (0.086)  
N                                               2,452          2,452        2,452           2,452         2,452 
N Strata/PSU                          132/265     132/265     132/265       132/265     132/265 
F and (Prob > F)                      (6, 128)      (7, 127)     (7, 127)       (7, 127)      (7, 127) 
                                               132.34*** 115.19*** 115.34***   104.34*** 111.74***  
Source: (ANES, 2017). Base: Voters only.  
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Demographic variables not displayed. Weighted 
analyses using Taylor Series calculation of sampling error. Analysis performed using STATA 
svyset following recommendation of ANES Codebook. Full model available in Table C.2 
in Appendix. 
 
Model III tests our anti-politician hypothesis. It shows that the more Irish voters 
held anti-elite sentiments, the higher the likelihood of supporting either Sinn Féin 
or AAA. The difference in the probability of supporting them is about ten points 
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(see Appendix Figure C.1). However, and perhaps surprisingly considering the tenor 
of the campaign, we find no evidence that these sentiments correlate with the 
likelihood of backing Donald Trump. Our results again suggest heterogeneity. Anti-
elite sentiment was an essential ingredient in the support base of parties standing 
on a populist platform in Ireland. However, this did not transfer to the US. Thus, 
we conclude modest support for H2: macro heterogeneity reigns supreme.  
Model IV in the United States shows negative attitudes toward immigration 
strongly correlated with support for Donald Trump. It shows that the more 
unenthusiastic an American voter was about immigration, the more likely they were 
to support Mr Trump. Support for him among people who held favorable views 
towards immigrants was 30 per cent, but this rises to 70 per cent among those who 
are most fierce against immigration (see Appendix Figure C.2). However, we must 
keep the extent of this effect in context. Few voters in America held vehemently 
anti-immigrant attitudes and thus the number of votes Mr Trump harvested from 
this issue is not likely to have been excessive. In Ireland, a different picture emerges. 
We find no evidence of an association between attitudes towards immigration and 
a vote for parties standing on a populist platform. Again, unconditional support for 
the idea that similar tenets of populism drive support for parties and candidates 
espousing a populist platform is not borne out. Instead, we conclude mixed support 
for H3.  
Turning to our nativist hypothesis, the analysis once again points to macro 
heterogeneity. In America, Model V shows that voters who believed nativism was 
important were substantially more likely to vote for Donald Trump. Teasing this 
out, among voters for whom nativism was not at all salient, there was a 34 per cent 
likelihood of supporting him (see Appendix Figure C.3). It steadily rises the more 
salient nativist feelings become, peaking at a 51 per cent likelihood of supporting 
Mr Trump among those who believe nativism is very important. Given that most 
US voters considered nativist feelings important, this suggests that Mr Trump 
garnered a significant quantity of votes from this issue. Yet, in Ireland, its role is 
negligible. We deduce diverse support for H4 – again illustrating macro 
heterogeneity. 
 
 
VI  CONCLUSION 
 
In terms of theoretical debates within the literature explicitly devoted to populism, 
we note that if the purist definition of populism (i.e. anti-elitism) is accepted, our 
evidence suggests that populism only featured in the Irish case, thus undermining 
the idea of a global populist wave. However, we posit that this narrow 
conceptualisation risks missing essential dimensions where strong sentiments 
regarding a perceived nemesis motivated voters. In the American case, intense 
feelings of nativism in many voters were prominent in the outcome. Hence, we 
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suggest that the broader conceptualisation of populism that we subscribe to provides 
a more thorough understanding of vote choice and populism in these elections. One 
of our significant results is that different tenets of populism mattered in each state, 
consonant with typical findings in the literature. For the populist wave idea, 
speaking of populism’s impact on the vote in normal terms conceals the different 
motivations underlying the success of candidates standing on a populist platform 
in different states. In sum, while there is support for the premise of populism 
shaping the vote, a more nuanced view of the populist wave idea is required.  
Our results also speak to the ongoing debate about the conceptualisation of 
populism as an ideology. How much unity is there to the concept of ‘the people’ 
when motivations for support of a populist candidate differ depending on context? 
The change to the chameleon across our cases appears to run more than skin deep, 
possibly turning a carnivore into a vegetarian. Such a degree of metamorphosis 
challenges the argument that populism is sufficiently coherent to qualify as an 
ideology. Explaining this away by arguing that we have merely identified left-and 
right-wing populism misses the point that acceptance of this variation undermines 
the overall coherence of populism as an ideology. We embrace this variation as part 
of populism but argue that glossing over the importance of it in underlying 
motivations involves too high a retreat up the ladder of abstraction. Instead, our 
research suggests that host ideologies have an essential role to play in the 
relationship between populism and the vote, and need to be factored in. This moves 
us beyond arguments about whether populism is an ideology and allows us to focus 
on the pertinent subject of how context conditions the evolution of populism. 
Finally, our analysis shows that populist sentiments shaped vote choice in both 
Ireland and America – neither country traditionally associated with populism, 
enhancing the plausibility of the idea of a populist wave. However, we need to 
recognise that the usual suspects of partisanship, left-right ideology, and perceptions 
about the economy mattered more. In sum, populism mattered, but not as much as 
conventional wisdom might suggest, or as is implied by the populist wave premise. 
For the most part, we did not see a fundamental redefinition of the issues upon 
which the elections were decided. This implies that extending the focus to diverse 
cases is a useful strategy to avoid the risk of overestimating the importance of 
populist sentiments on the vote more generally. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A: VARIABLE CLASSIFICATIONS AND SURVEY 
QUESTIONS 
 
US: Vote for Donald Trump  
Ireland: Vote for Sinn Féin/Anti-Austerity Alliance 
This variable measures whether or not a respondent gave their first preference vote 
to Sinn Féin and the Anti-Austerity Alliance in the 2016 Irish general election or 
voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 US Presidential election. This is ascertained 
from variable Q12P1 in INES-2016 (CSES component) and V162034a in ANES.  
 
Strong leader in govt is good for country even if leader bends the rules to get 
things done 
This variable measures a respondent’s attitude to a strong leader in government 
being good for the country, even if the leader bends the rules to get things done. It 
is a scale variable that runs from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The 
questions on which the scale is based are as follows:  
Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat 
disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement? “Having a strong 
leader in government is good for [COUNTRY] even if the leader bends the rules to 
get things done”. 
This is ascertained from variable Q4_5 in INES-2016 (CSES component) and 
V162263 in ANES.  
 
Anti-Politician Sentiments 
This variable measures whether or not a respondent felt positive or negative towards 
politicians. It is a scale variable that runs from 1 (very positive) to 5 (very negative). 
This scale is constructed after a principal component analysis (see Appendix B). 
The questions on which the scale is based are as follows:  
Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat 
disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement?  
• Most politicians do not care about the people. 
• Politicians are the main problem in [COUNTRY]. 
• Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful. 
 
This is ascertained from variable Q4_2, Q4_4, and Q4_7 in INES-2016 (CSES 
component) and V162260, V162262, and V162265 in ANES.  
 
Anti-Immigration Sentiments 
This variable measures whether or not a respondent felt positive or negative towards 
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immigrants. It is a scale variable that runs from 1 (very positive) to 5 (very 
negative). This scale is constructed after a principal component analysis (see 
Appendix B). The questions on which the scale is based are as follows:  
Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat 
disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement? 
 
• Immigrants are generally good for [COUNTRY]’s economy. 
• [COUNTRY]’s culture is generally harmed by immigrants. 
 
This is ascertained from variable Q5A and Q5B in INES-2016 (CSES component) 
and V162268 and V162269 in ANES.  
 
Nativist Sentiments  
This variable measures whether or not a respondent felt nativism was important or 
not. It is a scale variable that runs from 1 (not important at all) to 4 (very important). 
This scale is constructed after a principal component analysis (see Appendix B). 
The questions on which the scale is based are as follows:  
How important do you think the following is for being truly [NATIONALITY]: 
1) very important; 2) fairly important; 3) not very important; 4) Not important at 
all? 
 
• To have been born in [COUNTRY]. 
• To have [NATIONALITY] ancestry. 
• To be able to speak [COUNTRY NATIONAL LANGUAGES].   
 
This is ascertained from variable Q6_1, Q6_3, and Q6_7 in INES-2016 (CSES 
component) and V162271, V162272, and V162273 in ANES.  
 
Age 
This variable measures a respondent’s age in years. This is ascertained from variable 
D01 in INES-2016 (CSES component) and V161267 in ANES.  
  
University Education 
This variable measures whether a respondent has university level education or not. 
This is ascertained from variable D03 in INES-2016 (CSES component) and 
V161270 in ANES. University educated respondents are coded as 1 while others 
are coded as 0.  
 
Female 
This variable measures whether a respondent was female or not. This is ascertained 
from variable D02 in INES-2016 (CSES component) and V161342 in ANES. 
Female respondents were coded as 1 while male/others were coded as 0.  
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US: Attached to GOP  
Ireland: Attached to Sinn Féin  
This variable measures whether a respondent is close to the Sinn Féin party in 
Ireland or to the Republican Party (GOP) in the United States.  
The following questions were posed to respondents:  
 
• “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?  
(1) Yes; (2) No; (8) Don’t Know” 
• “Which party do you feel closest to?” 
 
Respondents who answered ‘yes’ and said they identified with the GOP or Sinn 
Féin are coded 1. All others, including those who said they did not identify with a 
party or those who identified with another party are coded 0. Refused and missing 
cases are excluded from the analysis. This is ascertained from variable Q22 in 
INES-2016 (CSES component) and V162292a in ANES.  
 
Ideology 
This variable measures a respondent’s self-placement on the left-right ideological 
scale. This is ascertained from variable Q18 in INES-2016 (CSES component) and 
V162289 in ANES. The data is based on the following question posed to 
respondents:  
“Where would you place yourself on this scale? 0=Left; 10=Right.”  
This is a categorical variable, originally running from 0 to 10. Respondents 
who answered ‘Never Heard of’, ‘Don’t Know’, ‘Refused’, and missing cases are 
excluded from the analysis. 
 
Retrospective Economy 
This variable measures a respondent’s perception of the national economy at the 
time of their country’s election. This was ascertained from variable Q11a in INES-
2016 (CSES component) and V162280 in ANES.  
The data is based on the following question posed to respondents:  
“Would you say that over the past twelve months, the state of the economy in 
[COUNTRY] has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?” 
This is a categorical variable, originally running from 1 to 3. Respondents who 
answered ‘gotten better’ are coded 3 while respondents who said ‘gotten worse’ are 
coded 1. Respondents who said ‘stayed the same’ are coded 2. Respondents who 
answered ‘Don’t Know’, ‘Refused’, and missing cases are excluded from the 
analysis. 
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APPENDIX B: SUMMARY STATS AND FACTOR ANALYSIS 
 
Table B.1: Summary Statistics for Variables Included in the Multivariate 
Models in Ireland  
                                                                                N            M           SD       Min    Max  
Dependent variable                                                                                                         
Vote for Sinn Féin /Anti-Austerity Alliance          871      0.148      0.355      0        1 
                                                                                                                                       
Independent variables                                                                                                    
Strong leader in power who bends the rules          998     2.942      1.529      1        5 
Anti-politician sentiment                                       998     2.929      1.268      1        5 
Anti-immigration sentiment                                  994      2.313      0.953      1        5 
Nativist sentiment                                                  995      2.780      0.796      1        4 
Age                                                                        989     46.141    16.015     18       87 
University education                                              990      0.334      0.472      0        1 
Female                                                                 1,000      0.489      0.500      0        1 
Attached to Sinn Féin                                          1,000      0.094      0.292      0        1 
Ideology                                                                 914      5.498      2.112      0       10 
Retrospective economy                                         999      3.701      0.862      1        5  
Source: (Marsh et al., 2016). 
Note: Post-election interviews only. 
 
Table B.2: Summary Statistics for Variables Included in the Multivariate 
Models in the United States  
                                                                                N            M           SD       Min    Max  
Dependent variable                                                                                                         
Vote for Donald Trump                                        2,663      0.442     0.497      0        1 
                                                                                                                                       
Independent variables                                                                                                    
Strong leader in power who bends the rules        3,627     2.865     1.241      1        5 
Anti-politician sentiment                                     3,624     3.344     0.906      1        5 
Anti-immigration sentiment                                3,609      2.550     0.914      1        5 
Nativist sentiment                                                3,617      2.780     0.825      1        4 
Age                                                                      3,553     49.424    17.511     18       90 
University education                                            3,618      0.399     0.490      0        1 
Female                                                                 3,616      0.531     0.499      0        1 
Attached to GOP                                                 3,647      0.250     0.433      0        1 
Ideology                                                               3,503      5.722     2.463      0       10 
Retrospective economy                                       3,623      3.087     1.037      1        5  
Source: (ANES, 2017). 
Note: Post-election interviews only. 
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Table B.3: Principal Component Loadings for the Rotated Components of 
Measures of Populism for Ireland  
                                                                                                            Factor 
                                                                                            1                   2                 3  
Eigenvalue                                                                        2.739           1.572          1.083 
% of variance                                                                  34.2             19.7            13.5  
Politicians are the main problem                                      0.649                                 
Politicians don’t care about the people                             0.688                                 
Politicians care only about the rich and powerful            0.696                                 
Important to have Irish ancestry                                                           0.583             
Important to be born in Ireland                                                             0.530             
Important to be able to speak Irish language                                        0.469             
Immigrants are good for Ireland’s economy                                                            0.668 
Immigrants are good for Ireland’s culture                                                                0.531  
Cronbach’s alpha based on standardised item                  0.794           0.643          0.629  
Source: (Marsh et al., 2016). Base: voters only (n=898). 
 
 
Table B.4: Principal Component Loadings for the Rotated Components of 
Measures of Populism for the United States  
                                                                                                            Factor 
                                                                                            1                   2                 3  
Eigenvalue                                                                        2.949           1.742             
% of variance                                                                  36.8             21.7                  
Important to have American ancestry                               0.763                                 
Important to be able to speak English language               0.622                                 
Important to be born in US                                               0.763                                 
Politicians are the main problem                                                          0.616             
Politicians don’t care about the people                                                 0.735             
Politicians care only about the rich and powerful                                 0.755             
Immigrants are good for America’s economy                  0.649                                 
Immigrants are good for America’s culture                      0.731                                  
Cronbach’s alpha based on standardised item                  0.718           0.713              
Source: (ANES, 2017). Base: voters only (n=2,713). 
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APPENDIX C: RELATED EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
 
Figure C.1:  Average Predicted Effects of Sentiments Towards Elites and 
Vote for SF/AAA in the 2016 Irish General Election. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Marsh et al., 2016).  
Note: All other variables held constant at their mean values. Analysis based on Table 1/D.1 
Model III. Estimated using Stata margins command.  
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Figure C.2: Average Predicted Effects of Sentiments Towards Immigration 
and Vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 American Presidential Election. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (ANES, 2017).  
Note: United States weighted analyses based on post-election respondents. All other 
variables held constant at their mean values. Analysis based on Table 2/D.4 Model IV. 
Estimated using Stata margins command.  
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Figure C.3: Average Predicted Effects of Sentiments Towards Nativism and 
Vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 American Presidential Election 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (ANES, 2017).  
Note: United States weighted analyses based on post-election respondents. All other 
variables held constant at their mean values. Analysis based on Table 2/D.4 Model V. 
Estimated using Stata margins command. 
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Table C.1: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for  
Sinn Féin/Anti-Austerity Alliance in the 2016 Irish General Election  
Dependent variable: Vote for Sinn Féin and Anti-Austerity Alliance 
                                                I-IE           II-IE            III-IE           IV-IE           V-IE  
Age                                         –0.026*        –0.027*        –0.031**      –0.026*       –0.025* 
                                               (0.105)         (0.105)          (0.017)          (0.105)         (0.105) 
University Education             –0.908*        –0.927*        –0.678          –0.946*       –0.965* 
                                               (0.370)         (0.372)          (0.374)          (0.375)         (0.375) 
Female                                    –0.403          –0.398          –0.425          –0.398         –0.389 
                                               (0.314)         (0.315)          (0.319)          (0.314)         (0.315) 
Attached to Sinn Féin              5.088***      5.091***      4.937***      5.110***     5.178*** 
                                               (0.520)         (0.521)          (0.516)          (0.523)         (0.531) 
Ideology                                 –0.252***    –0.245**      –0.232**      –0.246**     –0.242** 
                                               (0.071)         (0.072)          (0.070)          (0.072)         (0.071) 
Retrospective economy          –0.490**      –0.484**      –0.263          –0.505**     –0.506** 
                                               (0.170)         (0.170)          (0.181)         (0.171)         (0.171) 
Strong leader who  
  bends rules                           –                 –0.049            –                   –                  – 
                                                                    (0.101)                                                       
Anti-politician sentiment         –                                        0.459**        –                  – 
                                                                                         (0.144)                                  
Anti-immigration sentiment     –                                        –                 –0.103           – 
                                                                                                              (0.159)             
Nativist sentiment                    –                                        –                   –                –0.269 
                                                                                                                                  (0.192) 
Constant                                   2.003*          2.101*        –0.165            2.253**       2.603** 
                                               (0.798)         (0.824)          (1.042)          (0.887)         (0.912)  
N                                          785               785               785               785              785 
Log likelihood                    –169.40        –169.28        –164.17        –169.19       –168.40 
Pseudo-R2                                        0.479            0.480            0.495            0.480           0.482  
Source of data: (Marsh et al., 2016). Base: Voters only.  
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
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Table C.2: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for Donald 
Trump in the 2016 American Presidential Election  
Dependent variable: Vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 US Presidential election 
                                                I-US          II-US           III-US          IV-US          V-US  
Age                                           0.013**        0.013**        0.013**        0.014**       0.011*  
                                               (0.004)         (0.004)          (0.004)          (0.004)         (0.004) 
University Education             –0.250          –0.200          –0.247            0.019         –0.104 
                                               (0.147)         (0.148)          (0.150)          (0.150)         (0.150) 
Female                                    –0.155         –0.145          –0.156          –0.181         –0.220 
                                               (0.137)         (0.136)          (0.136)          (0.141)         (0.137) 
Attached to GOP                      3.058***     3.051***      3.060***      3.109***     3.106***  
                                               (0.181)         (0.182)          (0.181)          (0.194)         (0.190) 
Ideology                                   0.258***      0.250***      0.258***      0.212***     0.220*** 
                                               (0.035)         (0.036)          (0.035)          (0.038)         (0.037) 
Retrospective economy          –0.835***    –0.841***    –0.834***    –0.743***   –0.802***  
                                               (0.066)         (0.066)          (0.066)         (0.070)         (0.065) 
Strong leader who  
  bends rules                           –                   0.126*          –                   –                  – 
                                                                    (0.057)                                                       
Anti-politician sentiment         –                   –                   0.010            –                  – 
                                                                                         (0.085)                                  
Anti-immigration sentiment     –                   –                   –                   0.757***     – 
                                                                                                              (0.087)             
Nativist sentiment                    –                   –                   –                   –                  0.489***  
                                                                                                                                  (0.086) 
Constant                                 –0.425          –0.763**      –0.460          –2.519***   –1.620** 
                                               (0.401)         (0.437)          (0.478)          (0.477)         (0.388)  
N                                               2,452           2,452             2,452            2,452           2,452 
N Strata/PSU                        132/265        132/265        132/265        132/265       132/265 
F and (Prob > F)                      (6, 128)       (7, 127)         (7, 127)         (7, 127)       (7, 127) 
                                             132.34***    115.19***    115.34***    104.34***    111.74***  
Source: (ANES, 2017). Base: Voters only.  
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Weighted analyses using Taylor Series calculation 
of sampling error. Analysis performed using STATA svyset following recommendation of 
ANES Codebook.  
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APPENDIX D: RELATED EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
 
Table D.1: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for  
Sinn Féin/Anti-Austerity Alliance in the 2016 Irish General Election 
Excluding Partisanship  
Dependent variable: Vote for Sinn Féin and Anti-Austerity Alliance 
                                                I-IE           II-IE            III-IE           IV-IE           V-IE  
Age                                         –0.015*        –0.015*        –0.020**      –0.015*       –0.015* 
                                               (0.007)         (0.007)          (0.007)          (0.007)         (0.007) 
University Education             –1.271***    –1.274***    –1.035***    –1.269***   –1.271***  
                                               (0.289)         (0.290)          (0.297)          (0.292)         (0.291) 
Female                                    –0.716**      –0.716**      –0.740**      –0.716**     –0.716**  
                                               (0.236)         (0.236)          (0.241)          (0.236)         (0.236) 
Ideology                                 –0.281***    –0.280***    –0.256***    –0.282***   –0.281***  
                                               (0.054)         (0.054)          (0.054)          (0.054)         (0.054) 
Retrospective economy          –0.641***    –0.640***    –0.365*        –0.640***   –0.641***  
                                               (0.131)         (0.131)          (0.141)         (0.132)        (0.131)  
Strong leader who  
  bends rules                           –                 –0.010            –                   –                  – 
                                                                    (0.073)                                                       
Anti-politician sentiment         –                                        0.531***      –                  – 
                                                                                         (0.106)                                  
Anti-immigration sentiment     –                                        –                   0.006           – 
                                                                                                              (0.117)             
Nativist sentiment                    –                                        –                   –                –0.001 
                                                                                                                                  (0.142) 
Constant                                   3.267***      3.288***      0.659            3.252***     3.269*** 
                                               (0.627)         (0.647)          (0.801)          (0.688)         (0.716)  
N                                                 785              785                785               785              785 
Log likelihood                        –273.47       –273.46         –259.87        –273.47       –273.47 
Pseudo-R2                                         0.159           0.159             0.201            0.159           0.159  
Source: (Marsh et al., 2016). Base: Voters only.  
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
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Table D.2: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for Fine Gael 
in the 2016 Irish General Election   
Dependent variable: Vote for Fine Gael 
                                                I-IE           II-IE            III-IE           IV-IE           V-IE  
Age                                           0.001            0.001            0.001            0.001           0.001 
                                               (0.006)         (0.006)          (0.007)          (0.007)         (0.007) 
University Education               0.369            0.406            0.321            0.356           0.345 
                                               (0.219)         (0.221)          (0.221)          (0.221)         (0.221) 
Female                                      0.177            0.188            0.178            0.172           0.182 
                                               (0.212)         (0.212)          (0.212)          (0.212)         (0.212) 
Ideology                                   0.180**        0.169**        0.178**        0.184**       0.184** 
                                               (0.057)         (0.057)          (0.057)          (0.058)         (0.057) 
Attached to Fine Gael              2.737***      2.748***      2.713***      2.741***     2.727*** 
                                               (0.228)         (0.229)          (0.229)          (0.228)         (0.228) 
Retrospective economy            0.772***      0.765***      0.707***      0.764***     0.770*** 
                                               (0.160)         (0.160)          (0.160)          (0.161)         (0.161) 
Strong leader who  
  bends rules                           –                   0.093            –                   –                  – 
                                                                    (0.069)                                                       
Anti-politician sentiment         –                                      –0.128            –                  – 
                                                                                         (0.096)                                  
Anti-immigration sentiment     –                                        –                 –0.044           – 
                                                                                                              (0.122)             
Nativist sentiment                    –                                        –                   –                –0.100 
                                                                                                                                  (0.138) 
Constant                                 –6.088***    –6.306***    –5.505***    –5.981***   –5.838*** 
                                               (0.780)         (0.800)          (0.889)          (0.834)         (0.850)  
N                                                 785              785                785               785              785 
Log likelihood                        –305.68       –304.77         –304.77        –305.61       –305.41 
Pseudo-R2                                         0.335           0.337             0.337            0.335           0.336  
Source: (Marsh et al., 2016). Base: Voters only.  
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
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Table D.3: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for  
Fianna Fáil in the 2016 Irish General Election   
Dependent variable: Vote for Fianna Fáil 
                                                I-IE           II-IE            III-IE           IV-IE           V-IE  
Age                                           0.011            0.011            0.011            0.011           0.011 
                                               (0.007)         (0.007)          (0.008)          (0.008)         (0.008) 
University Education               0.041            0.052            0.032            0.095           0.070 
                                               (0.249)         (0.251)          (0.253)          (0.253)         (0.252) 
Female                                    -0.114          -0.115           -0.115           -0.117          -0.130 
                                               (0.239)         (0.239)          (0.239)          (0.239)         (0.239) 
Ideology                                   0.099            0.097            0.099            0.090           0.094 
                                               (0.057)         (0.059)          (0.058)          (0.059)         (0.059) 
Attached to Fianna Fáil            3.395***      3.383***      3.391***      3.381***     3.371*** 
                                               (0.240)         (0.243)          (0.241)          (0.240)         (0.241) 
Retrospective economy          -0.188          -0.193           -0.201           -0.169          -0.173 
                                               (0.141)         (0.141)          (0.141)          (0.141)         (0.141) 
Strong leader who  
  bends rules                           –                   0.024            –                   –                  – 
                                                                    (0.077)                                                       
Anti-politician sentiment         –                                      –0.022            –                  – 
                                                                                         (0.105)                                  
Anti-immigration sentiment     –                                        –                   0.148           – 
                                                                                                              (0.124)             
Nativist sentiment                    –                                        –                   –                  0.137 
                                                                                                                                  (0.151) 
Constant                                 –2.716***    –2.770***    –2.610***    –3.093***   –3.067*** 
                                               (0.703)         (0.723)          (0.867)          (0.773)         (0.808)  
N                                                 785              785                785               785              785 
Log likelihood                        –261.65       –261.60         –261.63        –260.95       –261.24 
Pseudo-R2                                         0.356           0.356             0.356            0.358           0.357  
Source: (Marsh et al., 2016). Base: Voters only.  
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
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Table D.4: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for Donald 
Trump in the 2016 American Presidential Election Excluding Partisanship  
Dependent variable: Vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 US Presidential election 
                                                I-US          II-US           III-US          IV-US          V-US  
Age                                           0.015***      0.016***      0.015***      0.016***     0.015**  
                                               (0.004)         (0.004)          (0.004)          (0.004)         (0.004) 
University Education               0.032            0.078          –0.002            0.274*         0.137  
                                               (0.119)         (0.118)          (0.120)          (0.126)         (0.121) 
Female                                    –0.267*       –0.258*        –0.260*        –0.308*       –0.304* 
                                               (0.120)         (0.121)          (0.121)          (0.142)         (0.119) 
Ideology                                   0.414***      0.407***      0.414***      0.375***     0.385*** 
                                               (0.035)         (0.036)          (0.036)          (0.037)         (0.037) 
Retrospective economy          –0.908***    –0.913***    –0.915***    –0.825***   –0.887***  
                                               (0.066)         (0.066)          (0.067)         (0.069)         (0.066) 
Strong leader who  
  bends rules                           –                   0.124*          –                   –                  – 
                                                                    (0.049)                                                       
Anti-politician sentiment         –                   –                 –0.104            –                  – 
                                                                                         (0.072)                                  
Anti-immigration sentiment     –                   –                   –                   0.699***     – 
                                                                                                              (0.072)             
Nativist sentiment                    –                   –                   –                   –                  0.392***  
                                                                                                                                  (0.082) 
Constant                                 –0.638          –0.985*        –0.257          –2.555***   –1.612** 
                                               (0.409)         (0.445)          (0.448)          (0.456)         (0.404)  
N                                               2,452           2,452             2,452            2,452           2,452 
N Strata/PSU                          132/265      132/265         132/265        132/265       132/265 
F and (Prob > F)                      (5, 129)       (6, 128)         (6, 128)         (6, 128)       (6, 128) 
                                               84.76***     74.03***       69.86***      87.98***     76.46***  
Source: (ANES, 2017). Base: Voters only.  
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Weighted analyses using Taylor Series calculation 
of sampling error. Analyses performed using STATA svyset following recommendation of 
ANES Codebook.  
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Table D.5: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for  
The Republican Party in the 2016 General Election (House)  
Dependent variable: Vote for Republican Party in the 2016 House election 
                                                I-US          II-US           III-US          IV-US          V-US  
Age                                           0.004            0.004            0.004            0.004           0.003    
                                               (0.004)         (0.003)          (0.003)          (0.003)         (0.003) 
University Education               0.078            0.079            0.067            0.194           0.117  
                                               (0.112)         (0.115)          (0.115)          (0.111)         (0.113) 
Female                                    –0.302**     –0.302**      –0.300**      –0.315**     –0.312** 
                                               (0.111)         (0.111)          (0.111)          (0.112)         (0.111) 
Ideology                                   0.184***      0.184***      0.184***      0.159***     0.172*** 
                                               (0.029)         (0.029)          (0.029)          (0.029)         (0.030) 
Attached to the GOP                1.590***      1.590***      1.583***      1.572***     1.596***    
                                               (0.154)         (0.154)          (0.155)          (0.155)         (0.153) 
Retrospective economy          –0.368***    –0.369***    –0.371***    –0.314***   –0.357***    
                                               (0.066)         (0.066)          (0.066)          (0.068)         (0.066) 
Strong leader who  
  bends rules                           –                   0.002            –                   –                  – 
                                                                    (0.049)                                                       
Anti-politician sentiment         –                   –                 –0.035            –                  – 
                                                                                         (0.066)                                  
Anti-immigration sentiment     –                   –                   –                   0.337***     – 
                                                                                                              (0.072)             
Nativist sentiment                    –                   –                   –                   –                  0.135 
                                                                                                                                  (0.074) 
Constant                                 –0.807*        –0.813**      –0.678          –1.719         –1.130 
                                               (0.322)         (0.343)          (0.393)          (0.392)         (0.367)  
N                                               2,502           2,452             2,452            2,452           2,452 
N Strata/PSU                          132/265      132/265         132/265        132/265       132/265 
F and (Prob > F)                      (7, 127)       (7, 127)         (7, 127)         (7, 127        (7, 127)  
                                               56.80***     48.53***       48.76***      50.17***     49.26***  
Source: (ANES, 2017). Base: Voters only.  
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Weighted analyses using Taylor Series calculation 
of sampling error. Analysis performed using STATA svyset following recommendation of 
ANES Codebook.  
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Table D.6: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for  
Hillary Clinton in the 2016 American Presidential Election  
Dependent variable: Vote for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 US Presidential election 
                                                I-US          II-US           III-US          IV-US          V-US  
Age                                         –0.008          –0.008          –0.008          –0.008         –0.007 
                                               (0.004)         (0.004)          (0.004)          (0.004)         (0.004) 
University Education               0.021            0.010            0.029          –0.144         –0.093 
                                               (0.126)         (0.131)          (0.127)          (0.135)         (0.137) 
Female                                      0.268*         0.266*          0.265*          0.309*         0.309*  
                                               (0.131)         (0.132)          (0.131)          (0.136)         (0.132) 
Ideology                                 –0.278***    –0.276***    –0.277***    –0.250***   –0.248*** 
                                               (0.036)         (0.037)          (0.037)          (0.038)         (0.038) 
Attached to DEM                     3.227***      3.224***      3.226***      3.142***     3.248*** 
                                               (0.227)         (0.227)          (0.225)          (0.224)         (0.227) 
Retrospective economy            0.770***      0.771***      0.771***      0.713***     0.746*** 
                                               (0.079)         (0.079)          (0.080)          (0.080)         (0.080) 
Strong leader who  
  bends rules                           –                 –0.028            –                   –                  – 
                                                                    (0.057)                                                       
Anti-politician sentiment         –                   –                   0.030            –                  – 
                                                                                         (0.079)                                  
Anti-immigration sentiment     –                   –                   –                 –0.426***     – 
                                                                                                              (0.088)             
Nativist sentiment                    –                   –                   –                   –                –0.359*** 
                                                                                                                                  (0.089) 
Constant                                 –1.280**      –1.206*        –1.394*        –0.157         –0.421 
                                               (0.426)         (0.474)          (0.549)          (0.479)         (0.497)  
N                                               2,502           2,452             2,452            2,452           2,452 
N Strata/PSU                          132/265      132/265         132/265        132/265       132/265 
F and (Prob > F)                      (6, 128)       (7, 127)         (7, 127)         (7,127)        (7, 127) 
                                               50.05***     42.49***       44.61***      44.96***     47.53***  
Source: (ANES, 2017). Base: Voters only.  
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Weighted analyses using Taylor Series calculation 
of sampling error. Analysis performed using STATA svyset following recommendation of 
ANES Codebook.  
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Table D.7: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for  
Donald Trump in the 2016 American Presidential Election  
Face-to-Face Sample Only  
Dependent variable: Vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 US Presidential election 
                                                I-US          II-US           III-US          IV-US          V-US  
Age                                           0.018            0.018            0.018            0.018           0.016 
                                               (0.010)         (0.010)          (0.010)          (0.010)         (0.010) 
University Education             –0.177          –0.149          –0.084            0.135           0.025 
                                               (0.264)         (0.251)          (0.258)          (0.278)         (0.278) 
Female                                    –0.223         –0.232          –0.234          –0.300         –0.294  
                                               (0.294)         (0.302)          (0.296)          (0.300)         (0.290) 
Ideology                                   0.342***      0.335***      0.344***      0.277***     0.302*** 
                                               (0.066)         (0.068)          (0.066)          (0.068)         (0.068) 
Attached to the GOP                2.755***      2.755***      2.806***      2.818***     2.840*** 
                                               (0.268)         (0.267)          (0.264)          (0.298)         (0.301) 
Retrospective economy          –1.030***    –1.029***    –1.017***    –0.961***   –0.996*** 
                                               (0.181)         (0.181)          (0.183)          (0.170)         (0.183) 
Strong leader who bends rules –                   0.059            –                   –                  – 
                                                                    (0.094)                                                       
Anti-politician sentiment         –                   –                   0.183            –                  – 
                                                                                         (0.134)                                  
Anti-immigration sentiment     –                   –                   –                   0.793***     – 
                                                                                                              (0.190)             
Nativist sentiment                    –                   –                   –                   –                  0.465*  
                                                                                                                                  (0.176) 
Constant                                 –0.542          –0.699          –1.221          –2.427*       –1.749* 
                                               (0.855)         (0.824)          (0.797)          (0.822)         (0.752)  
N                                                 677              677                677               677              677 
N Strata/PSU                            32/65          32/65             32/65            32/65           32/65 
F and (Prob > F)                       (6, 28)         (7, 27)           (7, 27)           (7, 27)         (7, 27)  
                                               55.76***     49.11***       45.64***      50.00***     41.95***  
Source: (ANES, 2017). Base: Voters only.  
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Weighted analyses using Taylor Series calculation 
of sampling error. Analyses performed using STATA svyset following recommendation of 
ANES Codebook.  
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Table D.8: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for  
Donald Trump in the 2016 American Presidential Election Using Purist11  
Measure of Populism  
Dependent variable: Vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 US Presidential election 
                                                                                          I-US                         II-US  
Age                                                                                   0.013**                   0.013** 
                                                                                        (0.004)                     (0.004) 
University Education                                                      –0.250                     –0.236 
                                                                                        (0.146)                     (0.147) 
Female                                                                            –0.156                     –0.158   
                                                                                        (0.137)                     (0.137) 
Ideology                                                                            0.258***                 0.256*** 
                                                                                        (0.035)                     (0.035) 
Attached to the GOP                                                         3.058***                 3.062*** 
                                                                                        (0.182)                     (0.181) 
Retrospective economy                                                  –0.835***               –0.831*** 
                                                                                        (0.065)                     (0.066) 
People should make important decisions                         –                               0.063 
                                                                                                                         (0.063) 
Constant                                                                          –0.425                     –0.648 
                                                                                        (0.400)                     (0.454)  
N                                                                                       2,452                         2,451 
N Strata/PSU                                                                   132/65                       132/65 
F and (Prob > F)                                                             (6, 128)                     (7, 127) 
                                                                                     132.34***                 112.82***  
Source: (ANES, 2017). Base: Voters only.  
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Weighted analyses using Taylor Series calculation 
of sampling error. Analyses performed using STATA svyset following recommendation of 
ANES Codebook.  
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11 We classify the purist measures of populism as those that specifically refer to “the people” or closely 
mimic some of the questions asked by Akkermann et al. (2014). We do not include the question about 
compromise as it was not asked in Ireland, thereby limiting the comparison. 
Table D.9: Logit Model Exploring the Determinants of the Vote for  
Sinn Féin/Anti-Austerity Alliance in 2016 Irish General Election Using  
Purist Measure of Populism   
Dependent variable: Vote for Sinn Féin and Anti-Austerity Alliance 
                                                                                     I-IE                         II-IE  
Age                                                                                 –0.026*                   –0.026* 
                                                                                        (0.011)                     (0.011) 
University Education                                                      –0.909*                   –0.889* 
                                                                                        (0.369)                     (0.373) 
Female                                                                            –0.403                     –0.415   
                                                                                        (0.314)                     (0.316) 
Ideology                                                                          –0.252***               –0.249*** 
                                                                                        (0.071)                     (0.071) 
Attached to Sinn Féin                                                       5.088***                 5.064*** 
                                                                                        (0.521)                     (0.522) 
Retrospective economy                                                  –0.489**                 –0.471** 
                                                                                        (0.170)                     (0.174) 
People should make important decisions                         –                               0.055 
                                                                                                                         (0.113) 
Constant                                                                            2.003                       1.724 
                                                                                        (0.798)                     (0.985)  
N                                                                                         785                            785 
Log likelihood                                                             –169.39861               –169.28079 
Pseudo-R2                                                                                           0.480                         0.480  
Source: (Marsh et al., 2016). Base: Voters only.  
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
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Table D.10: An Exploration of Differences Between Ireland and the  
United States  
                                                             Ireland                              United States  
Individual level                                                                             
Partisanship                                       Low                                  High 
Mean voter perception  
  of economy (1-5)                           3.70                                   3.09 
Mean voter ideology (0-10)               5.50                                   5.72 
                                                                                                     
Macro level: political system                                                       
Electoral System                                PR                                     Majoritarian 
Governance System                           Parliamentary                   Presidential 
Party System                                      Multi-party                       2-Party 
‘Classic populist party’ in situ          No                                     No  
                                                                                                     
Macro level: cultural                                                                    
Proportion of white people                94.3%                               73.6% 
Emigration                                         High                                  Low 
Immigration                                       High                                  High  
Language                                           Dominant language          Dominant language but 
                                                          but small segments           large segments speak 
                                                          speak other languages       other languages 
                                                                                                     
Macro level: economic/regional                                                   
Geography                                         Europe                              North America 
Size (area and population)                 Small                                 Large 
Military Stance                                  Neutral                              Major World Player 
Cost of living index (numbeo)          84.88                                 77.23 
Welfare system (Epsing-Anderson)   Liberal                              Liberal 
Gross National Income                      Mid-table                          Among highest in world 
GDP                                                   Mid-table                          Among highest in world  
Please note: Italics indicate similarities.  
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